A measure of segregation based on social interactions F Echenique, RG Fryer Jr Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (2), 441-485, 2007 | 436* | 2007 |

A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets F Echenique, J Oviedo Caltech SS Working Paper No. 1185, 2004 | 330 | 2004 |

The Money Pump as a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations F Echenique, S Lee, M Shum mimeo, 2010 | 221 | 2010 |

How to control controlled school choice F Echenique, MB Yenmez American Economic Review 105 (8), 2679-2694, 2015 | 210 | 2015 |

Revealed preference theory CP Chambers, F Echenique Cambridge University Press, 2016 | 199 | 2016 |

A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues F Echenique, MB Yenmez Games and Economic Behavior 59 (1), 46-71, 2007 | 161 | 2007 |

Comparative statics by adaptive dynamics and the correspondence principle F Echenique Econometrica 70 (2), 833-844, 2002 | 135 | 2002 |

A short and constructive proof of Tarski’s fixed-point theorem F Echenique International Journal of Game Theory 33 (2), 215-218, 2005 | 128 | 2005 |

THE REVEALED PREFERENCE THEORY OF STABLE AND EXTREMAL STABLE MATCHINGS F ECHENIQUE, S LEE, M SHUM, MB YENMEZ | 124* | |

Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods F Echenique, J Oviedo California Institute of Technology, 2002 | 123 | 2002 |

Is school segregation good or bad? F Echenique, RG Fryer Jr, A Kaufman American Economic Review 96 (2), 265-269, 2006 | 108 | 2006 |

Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements AS Edlin, F Echenique Journal of Economic Theory, 2004 | 98* | 2004 |

Contracts versus salaries in matching F Echenique American Economic Review 102 (1), 594-601, 2012 | 89 | 2012 |

Clearinghouses for two‐sided matching: An experimental study F Echenique, AJ Wilson, L Yariv Quantitative Economics 7 (2), 449-482, 2016 | 87 | 2016 |

The perception-adjusted Luce model F Echenique, K Saito, G Tserenjigmid Mathematical Social Sciences 93, 67-76, 2018 | 86 | 2018 |

General luce model F Echenique, K Saito Economic Theory 68 (4), 811-826, 2019 | 85 | 2019 |

Savage in the Market F Echenique, K Saito Econometrica 83 (4), 1467-1495, 2015 | 78 | 2015 |

What matchings can be stable? The testable implications of matching theory F Echenique Mathematics of operations Research 33 (3), 757-768, 2008 | 75 | 2008 |

Supermodularity and preferences CP Chambers, F Echenique Journal of Economic Theory 144 (3), 1004-1014, 2009 | 70 | 2009 |

An experimental study of decentralized matching F Echenique, A Robinson-Cortés, L Yariv arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.10872, 2024 | 66 | 2024 |