| The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment G Kahane, K Wiech, N Shackel, M Farias, J Savulescu, I Tracey Social cognitive and affective neuroscience 7 (4), 393-402, 2012 | 244 | 2012 |
| An fMRI study measuring analgesia enhanced by religion as a belief system K Wiech, M Farias, G Kahane, N Shackel, W Tiede, I Tracey Pain 139 (2), 467-476, 2008 | 234 | 2008 |
| Methodological issues in the neuroscience of moral judgement G Kahane, N Shackel Mind & language 25 (5), 561-582, 2010 | 143 | 2010 |
| Cold or calculating? Reduced activity in the subgenual cingulate cortex reflects decreased emotional aversion to harming in counterintuitive utilitarian judgment K Wiech, G Kahane, N Shackel, M Farias, J Savulescu, I Tracey Cognition 126 (3), 364-372, 2013 | 121 | 2013 |
| The vacuity of postmodernist methodology N Shackel Metaphilosophy 36 (3), 295-320, 2005 | 97 | 2005 |
| Bertrand's paradox and the principle of indifference N Shackel Philosophy of Science 74 (2), 150-175, 2007 | 92 | 2007 |
| Do abnormal responses show utilitarian bias? G Kahane, N Shackel Nature 452 (7185), E5-E5, 2008 | 76 | 2008 |
| The two-envelope paradox M Clark, N Shackel Mind 109 (435), 415-442, 2000 | 72 | 2000 |
| The form of the Benardete dichotomy N Shackel The British journal for the philosophy of science 56 (2), 397-417, 2005 | 31 | 2005 |
| The world as a graph: defending metaphysical graphical structuralism N Shackel Analysis 71 (1), 10-21, 2011 | 15 | 2011 |
| The world as a graph: defending metaphysical graphical structuralism N Shackel Analysis 71 (1), 10-21, 2011 | 15 | 2011 |
| Shutting Dretske’s door N Shackel Erkenntnis 64 (3), 393-401, 2006 | 14 | 2006 |
| Bangu’s random thoughts on Bertrand’s Paradox DP Rowbottom, N Shackel Analysis 70 (4), 689-692, 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons N Shackel Philosophical Studies 167 (3), 607-633, 2014 | 8 | 2014 |
| The normativity of rationality N Shackel Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 167-189, 2015 | 6 | 2015 |
| A problem for the unity of normativity N Shackel Analysis 74 (3), 404-411, 2014 | 5 | 2014 |
| Pseudoscience and idiosyncratic theories of rational belief N Shackel Philosophy of pseudoscience: Reconsidering the demarcation problem, 417-438, 2013 | 5 | 2013 |
| Decision theory, symmetry and causal structure: Reply to Meacham and Weisberg M Clark, N Shackel Mind 112 (448), 691-701, 2003 | 5 | 2003 |
| Paradoxes of probability N Shackel | 4 | 2008 |
| On the Obligation to be Rational N Shackel University of Nottingham, 2004 | 4 | 2004 |
Guy KahaneUniversity of OxfordVerified email at philosophy.ox.ac.uk
